In the Furnace by Mehnert, Klaus, 1906-1984
VOL. VIU
lBE
~
COOllRY
SHANGHAI, JANUAHY 19Hj
IN THE FURNACE
By KLAUS MEHNERT
No. I
WHEN on Ncw Year's Eve the midnighthour was tolled from those of thechurch towers of Gcrmany that were
still standing, millions of Germans
were in t.he thick of battle, millions at work in
night shifts. millions asleep after a. long day's
toil in llrmament plants. In what little leisure
t.hey had for reflection, they will have look d
back on 1944 as representing the hardest tellt
their nation bas ever had to face in its history.
No other nation ill modern times has stood
a similar test. France, Poland, or Haly. not
to m ntion smaller countries: they all caved in
under 1\ fraction of the pressure borne by
Germany today. The British are proud of
their fortitude in tho summer and autumn of
1940 and on it blU>e their faith in the mornl
greatnell8 of their people. Yet Great Britain,
after Dunkirk, was IlIJ almost untouched island
which had seen no enemy soldier, ringed by a
huge navy, and baekcd up by the reaourees of
her g.lobe.encircling Empire and America's aid.
The Bolsheviks ba c their claim to the supe-
riority of the Soviet system and people on
their behavior during the time when the Ger-
mans were on the ban ks of the Volga. Yet in
the days of Stalingrad the USSR stilJ had almost
tw nty million square miles with huge industrial
plan til, raw materials, and agricultural produc-
tion on which no enemy plane had ever droppfd
a bomb. Both Great Britain and the Soviet
Union were then only in their second year of
the war, and neither of the two had more than
one front to look after.
The strain on the Germans in 1944 was in-
compafllbly grcater. :For them 1944 has been
a year of terrible sctbacks, hardship8. and dill-
appointments. During this year, their armiel'
had-to abandon arcas many times the size of
Germany in northern, eastern, southern, and
lVeete.rn Europe. Alone they faced the entire
manpower and industrial capacity of the
USSR and a large part of the maIl power and
industrial capacity of the USA and the Briti~h
Empire, not to mention all the many minor
8tate8 which are lined up a.)j around the Gel mon
fortress. Three of Germa.ny's ames left her camp
in 1944, two being pressed into the service of
the Red armies against her. The Atlantic
WalJ. although holding up the invasion, did
not prevent it. The new paperl:l were full of
obituaries, amOJlg thEm tbat of the most popular
military leader, Marshal Rommel. The eoun-
try's cities, plants. and railrolluli were under a
ceasele s hail of bcmbs fr(,m up to 2,000
bomh rs a day. and countlesa Germalll:l were
deprived of aU their earthly poslSeslSionll. Many
valuable raw materials, including the oil of
Rumania" and territories rich in agricultural
production were lost. Neutral counuil'l:l were
forced by ber enemies to abandon trade with
the Reich. The re-election of Roosevelt tm-
phal:lizcd the fact that 110 slludcn ('hange in
American foreign }lolicy is likely to relieve thl:
prcsllure. Day and night. scores of rudio sta-
t ions alJ around GCJmany, iII programs diHctA:d
at the German p pulation, painted 11 black
picture of Germany's military and cOlJ<lmic
position. appealing to tbe Germans to quit and
calling ullon tbe 12 miJJiGll or more fureign
laborers in Go many to risc in H";olt.
• • •
Every German knows all this. For, howeVH
exuberant German Fublicity may ba,e been
in the earlier stage8 of the war, it wos grimly
realistic in Hl44 and lIas left the GlJmaDtl
under no illu8ions as to tbe gravity of the
crisis through \\hich they are pat'8iJJg.
Yet the strength and detumination \\'ith
which the Gel mans arc fightiTlg and WOl king-
and the testimon .. of their emmicll provcs thiE<
-are a8 great as if the wor hod jUI't ",tarted.
Reports cablfd by Allied wor corrctipondtDts
frem the front, articles written by the military
ccmmentators of their Il(;wl'papers, evrn the
tlpeecbC's of Churchill and Roosevelt, C.llpreb8
the en<mies' amaZlment at Gl'lmaIlY's stnnd.
They caJ:lDot und rstar;d it. They had figurfd:
the Gel mans haven't got n. cLaDce, thcrefoJ'f'
they'U quit. 'Iliat is what France did ill 1940.
But thcy find that tbe Goman determination
is gr ater in the sixth than in the finn, )' ar of
war, and that the entire naticm-mlD, w<.me·lJ
and ehildnn-arc fighting a8 one.
How can we account for this? ls it dcairt'
for glory, intoxication with I:\IOgOJ1S, a grand
i1Jusion. a Messianic ecmpln religious rnodne...... ,
the Gestapo, rapaciOlls instincts for world con-
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'qu08t~ The enemy war reporte show tllat
none of the3e explanations will do. So they
look for othel'lJ. Soviet newspapers allege that
the Germall8 are m£l.de drunk before being eent
into ba.ttle, and Anglo-Sa.xon commentators
hlW'p on the word "fanaticism," a word whioh
explains nothing. Yet the a03wer to the mo-
tives behind the phenomenon of Germany's
sta.nd is quite simple.
In the first place it is the nation's tremendoWi
will to live, which manifests itself in the readi.
U638 of each German to die tb.at Germany may
live; a will to live which knows: only those can
truly win life who are willing to risk death; a
will to live whieh has been enhanced by the
brutal frankness with whioh the enemies are
discussing the annib.ila.tion of a defeated Ger·
maQ. '
, In tbe seooml pla.oe, it is the German sense
of duty, It has often been rioiduled abroad
aQ~ uauaUy tniaundel'litood, beQause mos people
have &38umod that duty in the eyes of the
German means clicking his heels to superiors,
while in reality it is the following of inner
rather than exterior commands. Immanuel
Kant, Germany's greatest philosopher, was
the apostle of Duty. It was he who taught
the Germa.ni that all other attributes of
man-intelligence, courage, wealth, power-
may be good as well as evil, while only his
good ,intention is good' in itself.. Even if a
good intention should not be crowned by
SUCC883, it would, Kant said, "shine like a
je't{el, as something wbich carries its value in
itself."
RLW"Oly has an entire nation felt what its
duty W&3 with such overwheln;iing and simple
cla.rity as tho Gorma.ll8 do today: to fight and
to work. Of course, they also) p~e their
hopes in the new weapons, in the strength of
tho.ir fortifioations, in the 1'~ult8 being achieved
by the arlOed forces of their ally J~pan. But
tb.is is not what keeps them going. It is not
even'so much the question of vi$ltory or defeat.
They feel it simply to be their duty to carryon.
The final outcome, tbe individualGerma.n know8,
d6pondtt on ma.ny fa~tor3 beyond his reach. But
what ,lios plainly before him is his own duty. This
also explains the fact that there ia little diso11l-
sion of postwar plans in Germany today. It
indicates not lack of confidence in the future
but ~e irrelevance of such plans at the preeent
time. Fighting as they are for the survival
of their nation, the Germans feel no inclination
to theorize on what they will do with them.
selves or others after the fight. They are
convinoed tha.t, once they come out of thil
war, there will be no task they cannot master. -
In this mental state it is quite immaterirJ to
the German that the greatness of his struggle
has only led his enemies to more vociferous
hatred and threats of annihilation, and that
the same people who heap praise on Tito par-
tisans, Frenoh maquisa.rds, or Dutch saboteUl'll,
twist every sign of his extreme heroism into
new proof that he is a "war criminal."
Neutral observers have often said: "Would
it not be oleverer of Germany if •• :' and
then added some political advice. But the
Germans are beyond clever considerations 'today.
Each one just does his duty and each one feels:
since all 75 million of us are doing it, we oan-
not be wiped out. The growing empha8is
being placed upon the "People's Grenadiers"
recruited last summer and the nonuniformed
"People's Storm Divisions" recently orga*ed
is deeply significant. For Germany the 'irar
has become a people's war if ever there was one.
. . .'
The homeless war widow who is worki~ i,n
a factory; the farmer's wife who Hince 1939 has
seen her soldier hWlband only durinfJ r,~
periods of leave and is carrying on her ~otk
with the aid of priBoners of war; the mao' who
gOes on producmg war, material in a plant
bombed, evacuated, and rebuilt twenty times;
the boy or ~rl who for years has been handli~
the tasks of an adult; the villager of East
Prussia or the worker of the Saar who, leaving
his plough or machine, is throwing his heart
and "panzer fult" against the enemy tanks-
they can all look back on the bitter y~ of
1944 with pride: all that was 'petty, 861~sh,
and impure h&8 been burned away in)fiem
in the blast furnace of bombed cities and fi&m~
irig fronts. They have stood the test of 19«,
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TO OUR READERS
Our readers m':Jy have not'.ull lhat THE XXth CENTURY hru become thinner i" lAe'
'course of the years. But the. m'Jre observant amrmg them may aUo have di.8cerned tAal iI
haJJ been our p:Jlicy to effect tM.. paper-saving necessitated by the war without reducing lIN
m:Jf1azine'& contents. A.Bide from the fact that the. slimmer appearanu of the tnagaziM
is due 'PlJrUy to a thi"ner q~':Jlity oi p':Jper, tAe fewer number of pagu /aas bee" mada
up fo~ by the ,U8e of sm:J!ler' type (since Ju~ 1944) anti, start.ng lO11h thU i86U, ~" ,
! a reductio,n o/the m'J.rgin, which latter aU;' about 15 per cent to the content8 0/ eacA page. ,
